Assignment Impossible? Time for the final call for companies purchasing claims for denied boarding compensation? by Bates, John
Northumbria Research Link
Citation: Bates, John (2013) Assignment Impossible? Time for the final call for companies purchasing 
claims for denied boarding compensation? Travel Law Quarterly, 5 (3). pp. 183-188. ISSN 1759-8982 
Published by: Oakhurst Academic Press
URL:  https://www.travellawquarterly.co.uk/past-journals...  <https://www.travellawquarterly.co.uk/past-
journals/assignment-impossible/>
This version was downloaded from Northumbria Research Link: http://nrl.northumbria.ac.uk/25967/
Northumbria University has developed Northumbria Research Link (NRL) to enable users to access 
the University’s research output. Copyright © and moral rights for items on NRL are retained by the 
individual author(s) and/or other copyright owners.  Single copies of full items can be reproduced, 
displayed or performed, and given to third parties in any format or medium for personal research or 
study, educational, or not-for-profit purposes without prior permission or charge, provided the authors, 
title and full bibliographic details are given, as well as a hyperlink and/or URL to the original metadata 
page. The content must not be changed in any way. Full items must not be sold commercially in any  
format or medium without formal permission of the copyright holder.  The full policy is available online: 
http://nrl.northumbria.ac.uk/pol  i cies.html  
This  document  may differ  from the  final,  published version of  the research  and has been made 
available online in accordance with publisher policies. To read and/or cite from the published version 
of the research, please visit the publisher’s website (a subscription may be required.)
                        
  
ASSIGNMENT IMPOSSIBLE? TIME FOR THE FINAL CALL FOR COMPANIES 
PURCHASING CLAIMS FOR DENIED BOARDING COMPENSATION? 
John Bates 
 
Passenger rights to compensation for denied boarding, delayed and cancelled flights 
have been with us for over 8 years. Some airlines have met their obligations to 
passengers better than others.  The European Commission has recently weighed 
into the debate, expressing concern that passenger rights were not being vindicated.  
Should claims purchasing companies be part of the structures to bridge the gap in 
access to justice for consumers?  What are the competing tensions in encouraging 
access to justice and discouraging a market in claims? 
 John Bates looks at the issues 
 
Introduction 
An innovative business model for consumer redress has emerged - the claims 
purchasing company (‘CPC’).  The CPC business model has come under attack. In 
this journal, Sarah Prager challenges the legitimacy of ‘siphoning of compensation 
properly due to the consumer to a parasitic business which has not suffered the 
compensatable loss’ (Prager, S. ‘Claims Purchasing Companies: The Claimant’s 
Friend, or Unwelcome Parasite?’ [2013] TLQ XXX).  Here, I consider the counter-
arguments, in the context of CPCs and claims against airlines under Regulation 
261/2004/EC (‘the Regulation’).  Why should English law allow this business model 
to survive? 
 
The rights acquisition model 
Prager describes the business model as ‘brilliantly simple’. The CPC advertises its 
services, a consumer responds, the CPC assesses the claim’s prospects of success 
and value, and agrees to purchase the rights, by assignment, at a sum discounted 
from the claim’s potential value.  The CPC then pursues the claim against the third 
party, and profits from the differential between the acquisition cost and the sums 
received, together with any costs that may become payable.  
 
Regulation rights 
Readers will be familiar with the rights to compensation and assistance to 
passengers in the event of denied boarding, and of cancellation or long delays under 
the Regulation.  There is wide acceptance, at least among those advising aviation 
businesses, that consumer claims for infringement of Regulation rights enjoy strong 
  
prospects of success.  This is the product of consumer-friendly decisions cases 
including Sturgeon v Condor (conjoined cases C-402/07 and C-432/07), TUI Travel 
and others v Civil Aviation Authority and Nelson v Deutsche Lufthansa AG (conjoined 
cases (C-629/10 and C-581/10), together with a narrow interpretation, in Wallentin-
Hermann v Alitalia (C-549/07), of the ‘extraordinary circumstances’ permitting an 
airline to escape liability.  As Prager comments, ‘in most cases litigation will not be 
necessary, and there will be no question that compensation is payable.’  Consumers 
may be less familiar with the Regulation or European Court of Justice jurisprudence. 
 
The claims profile 
Regulation claims are of modest value, and, depending on the rights infringed, can 
include assistance, meals, refreshments, transfers, hotel accommodation and 
additional fixed sums ranging from €250 to €600 per passenger. In April 2013, the 
Civil Aviation Authority reported some €95,700 being recovered by delayed UK 
passengers in the preceding 6 months.  The scale of infringement is difficult to 
ascertain. Airlines naturally shy from disclosing this commercially sensitive 
information.  This has prompted other business models to develop, which harvest 
real-time airport flight departure and arrival data, to contrast with schedules. Any 
aggregation of high-volume, low-value, relatively risk-free claims carries the 
prospects of relatively high margins on investment. 
 
Challenges to the rights acquisition model 
Two legal uncertainties threaten the survival of these nascent business models: (1) 
are Regulation rights capable of being assigned; and (2) should an assignment of 
Regulation rights to a CPC be valid?  
 
Are Regulation rights capable of being assigned? 
In section 136 of the Law of Property Act 1925, a ‘debt or other legal thing in action’ 
is capable of being assigned.  Case law has developed a distinction between two 
classes of rights.  Personal rights, where the assignor’s identity is an essential aspect 
of it, are not capable of assignment. A classic example is an insurance policy where 
the policyholder’s identity materially affects the level of risk accepted and premium 
offered by the insurer (Peters v General Accident Fire & Life Insurance Corporation 
Limited [1938] 2 All ER 267). Impersonal rights are capable of assignment.  In 
Simpson v Norfolk and Norwich University Hospital NHS Trust [2012] QB 640, the 
Court of Appeal determined that a cause of action in tort for damages for personal 
injury was impersonal and capable of being assigned. 
  
 
Simpson strongly points toward a court determining that Regulation rights, being 
valued impersonally (including by reference to flight distances and periods of delay), 
are not contingent on personal identity, and are capable of assignment. 
 
Should the law recognise the assignment of Regulation rights as valid? 
This is more difficult. Two long-established English legal doctrines have traditionally 
prohibited outsiders to disputes from supporting the bringing or defending of claims. 
How do these doctrines sit comfortably (or at all) with the ‘brave new world’ of the 
modern dispute resolution landscape?   
 
‘Maintenance’ and ‘champerty’ 
‘Maintenance’ is ‘the procurement, by direct or indirect financial assistance, of 
another person to institute, or carry on or defend civil proceedings without lawful 
justification.’ ‘Champerty’ has been described as an ‘aggravated form’ of 
maintenance, where the [outsider] receives ‘a share of the proceeds of the … 
dispute.’ (Trendtex Trading Corporation v Credit Suisse [1980] 1 QB 629).  Originally, 
these rules sought to prevent powerful non-litigant outsiders from improperly 
influencing court processes, by intervening in disputes to perpetuate personal 
feuding.  The principle of equality before the law required this protection for weaker 
and more vulnerable litigants in disputes against exploitation by outsiders external to 
the dispute. We shall return to this theme. An agreement offending the doctrines of 
maintenance or champerty would be void as contrary to public policy.  
 
‘Trafficking in litigation’ – primary and secondary markets 
In Trendtex, the claimant company (‘T’) had a right to sue a third party bank (‘CBN’). 
T assigned that right to the defendant (‘CS’), on the understanding that CS might 
then further sell that right on to an unnamed party. T claimed its assignment was 
champertous, and should be set aside.  The House agreed. Lord Wilberforce 
considered the assignment involved ‘trafficking in litigation – a type of transaction 
which, under English law, is contrary to public policy.’   The Trendtex prohibition on 
the assignment of a bare right to litigate is a formidable obstacle to any rights 
acquisition model.   
 
Genuine interest? 
One exception to the maintenance doctrine was recognised in Trendtex by Lord 
Roskill, who stated: ‘in English law an assignee who can show that he has a genuine 
  
commercial interest in the enforcement of a claim of another and to that extent takes 
an assignment of that claim to himself is entitled to enforce that assignment unless 
by the terms of that assignment he falls foul of our law of champerty.’  In Trendtex, 
his Lordship could not see any reason why CS ‘should not have taken an assignment 
to themselves of [T’s] claim against CBN for the purpose of recouping for their own 
substantial losses...’  This seems consistent with the CPC model. The profit element 
is contentious. 
  
It is uncertain what amounts to a sufficient ‘genuine interest’.  In Simpson, Moore-
Bick LJ did ‘not think that it is possible to state in definitive terms what does and does 
not constitute a sufficient interest to support the assignment of a bare cause of action 
in tort for personal injury.’   His Lordship held that ‘to encourage litigation whose 
principal object is not to obtain a remedy for a legal wrong, but to pursue an object of 
a different kind altogether’ was not sufficient. CPCs are engaged by consumers to 
provide a remedy for infringement of Regulation rights: they do not acquire 
Regulation rights to pursue for political or altruistic ends as in Simpson.   
 
It is well- recognised that ‘few litigants bring or defend suits at their own expense’:  
Hill v Archbold [1968] 1 QB 686.  Examples include proceedings supported by 
insurers and trade unions, where the doctrine of maintenance has been held not to 
apply. Subrogation is a better example. Under an insurance policy, an insurer can 
acquire rights of subrogation to stand in the shoes of a policyholder to recover the 
insurer’s outlay.  The courts have sometimes relaxed rigid principles in this area. In 
Shulman v S H Simon (Electrical) Ltd [2010] EWHC 2762 (QB), the court allowed 
recovery of private medical costs, notwithstanding the absence of any direct 
contractual relationship between the healthcare insurer and the victim employee of 
the policyholder. 
 
Reappraising public policy justifications 
In some circumstances, public policy tilts in favour of upholding an agreement that 
would otherwise be champertous. In Trendtex it was noted that doctrines ‘must be 
reappraised in light of current notions of public policy’ and in Giles v Thompson 
[1994] 1 AC 142, Lord Mustill considered ‘the law on maintenance and champerty 
can best be kept in forward motion by looking to its origins as a principle of public 
policy designed to protect the purity of justice and the interests of vulnerable 
litigants.’ 
 
  
So, we return to the policy rationale for the doctrines of maintenance and champerty: 
upholding equality before the law and the protection for weaker litigants against more 
powerful opponents. In Alabaster v Harness [1895] 1 QB 339, maintenance did not 
apply if given by ‘a man [on] behalf of a poor man, who but for the aid of his rich 
helper could not assert his rights, or would be oppressed and overbourne in his 
endeavour to maintain them.’  State financial support for claims, in the form of legal 
aid, exemplified such legitimate support. 
 
Access to justice must be real, rather than illusory. Justice requires that a party have 
effective mechanisms for vindicating their rights and holding more powerful 
opponents to account.  In the context of Regulation rights, in March 2013 the 
European Commission expressed concern that passengers have difficulty in claiming 
what they are entitled to under the Regulation and become frustrated when air 
carriers did not appear to be applying the Regulation properly (Memo/13/203, 13 
March 2013). Surveys reported that, where the Regulation was engaged, less than 
50% of passengers were offered meals, refreshment and accommodation, a tiny 
proportion (2% to 4% in a Danish survey), received any financial compensation to 
which they were entitled, and in a German survey, 20% of complaining passengers 
received no response from the air carrier.  Vice President Slim Kallas commented ‘It 
is very important that passenger rights do not exist just on paper’.  The present 
system does not provide effective vindication of Regulation rights.   
 
Vindication of rights can be measured in different ways.  Clearly, consumers do not 
receive from a CPC the full value of their Regulation rights in return for their 
assignment, but the price may be more than the unrepresented consumer pursuing 
their own claim, particularly given the Commission surveys noted above.  The 
consumer is also trading off the (irrecoverable) valuable time and effort expended by 
any litigant in person pursuing a small claim (£10,000 from 1 April 2013), along with 
the (low) risk of adverse costs liabilities and irrecoverable legal costs, even if 
successful. 
 
The criticism that CPCs ‘siphon compensation properly due to the consumer’ 
overlooks the policy objective of providing substantive vindication to consumers 
whose substantive rights have been infringed, and ultimately is somewhat 
paternalistic: should autonomous citizens be freely trusted to determine for 
themselves how and at what price they achieve a vindication of their lawful right to 
damages? How is this different from any civil dispute in which a party accepts a lower 
  
settlement sum now rather than the delayed chance of a higher sum? A practical 
vindication is better than none at all. 
 
One protection from any perceived unfair exploitation of consumers by CPCs may lie 
in measuring the proportionality of profit generated by the assignee, and relating this 
to the legitimacy of the transaction. Trendtex was distinguished subsequently in 
Brownton Ltd v Edward Moore Inbucon Ltd [1985] 3 All ER 499, not cited in Simpson. 
In Brownton, Lloyd LJ held that ‘it was not fatal to the validity of an assignment that 
the assignee might be better off as a result of the assignment, or that the assignee 
might make a profit out of it , however, where the ‘figures … were massively 
disproportionate’ then the agreement would be champertous.’  
 
In Trendtex the original sell-on value was expected as $800,000 but eventually 
realised $8m. In Advanced Technology Structures Ltd v Cray Valley Products Ltd 
[1993] BCLC 723, rights were acquired for £10,000, and sold for £10m. In Simpson, 
the assignee purchased the rights for £1, to pursue her ‘campaign’, and then sought 
to extend the cap of the claim to a potential £15,000.  In all 3 decisions, the 
agreements were champertous, but these are far removed from CPCs with margins 
in the order of 30-40% of claims worth just a few hundred euros. 
 
Restrictions on funding threaten the vindication of any rights, particularly of modest 
value.  Since Trendtex, the funding landscape has been transformed, most recently 
from 1 April 2013. Conditional Fee Agreements reward advisors with enhanced profit 
contingent on success in a dispute. Contingency fee agreements rewarded advisors 
in ‘non-contentious’ disputes, and others, including expert witnesses, in all work, with 
fees (and profit) measured as a proportion of the ‘spoils of the dispute’. Advisors 
agreeing to indemnify clients against adverse costs orders have provided a different 
form of external financial protection to claimants. In each of these developments, 
courts have recognised the shift in public policy towards improving access to justice 
for claimants (Awwad v Gerraghty & Co [2001] QB 570), R (Factortame) v Secretary 
of State for Transport, Local Government and the Regions (No.8) [2003] QB 381 and 
Sibthorpe v Southwark London Borough Council [2011] EWCA Civ 25).  Changes 
have increased claimants’ prospects of achieving redress for infringement of their 
rights.  The trend continues with developments in permitted third party litigation 
funding, where external funders agree to fund costs of claimants in return for a share 
of proceeds, and the advent of Damages-Based Agreements from 1 April 2013. 
 
  
In Simpson, Moore-Bick LJ considered that ‘Access to justice is not a consideration, 
since there is no reason to think that the assignor could not have pursued his claim 
as easily as the [assignee], if he wished to do so.’ Simpson is, in my view, 
distinguishable. Legal representation was available to pursue claims against the 
Trust vigorously.  An individual unrepresented consumer may find enforcing 
Regulation rights against an experienced commercial airline very challenging.  
Access to justice must be a factor. 
 
The administration of justice is a policy factor. In Simpson, Moore-Bick LJ considered 
‘it would be damaging to the administration of justice and unfair to defendants for the 
law to recognise an interest of that kind … because the conduct of the proceedings, 
including aspects such as a willingness to resort to mediation and a readiness to 
compromise, where appropriate, is entirely in the hands of the assignee and is liable 
to be distorted by considerations that have little if anything to do with the merits of the 
claim itself’.   
 
With respect, his Lordship fails to recognise that an assignee, as a party in their own 
right, engaging in unreasonable conduct of the types described runs not only the risk 
of the court’s approbation but of significant adverse costs liability  – moreso in the 
post-April 2013 atmosphere of stricter compliance with the Civil Procedure Rules.  
Strictly, maintenance applies only to litigation, such as in Simpson: Re Trepca Mines 
Limited (No.2) [1963] Ch 199, but Moore-Bick LJ’s concerns do not apply readily to 
CPCs: neither ADR or small claims litigation for vindicating modest-value Regulation 
rights is likely to be engaged as proportionate or relevant.  The notions of fairness to 
defendants are different between difficult high-risk negligence claims against a 
publicly-funded hospital in Simpson and very small claims against insured 
commercial airlines for infringements of Regulation rights so strong that success is 
almost inevitable. 
 
Costs sanctions, recent case law, including Fairclough Homes Limited v Summers 
[2012] UKSC 26, and increased appetite for imposing penalties for contempt of court 
discourage fraudulent and exaggerated claims further. Axiomatically, CPCs have no 
scope to enlarge the value of Regulation rights claims beyond sums fixed by the 
Regulation (for example, Graham v Thomas Cook Group [2012] EWCA Civ 1355), 
and, as parties in their own right, they are subject to expectations as to behaviour in 
any dispute.   Finally, in this context, concerns of fuelling a ‘compensation culture’ in 
illegitimate claims can be discounted: as has been noted, claims for infringement of 
  
Regulation rights are often practically indefensible and carry negligible risks of 
exaggeration.   
 
Concluding thoughts 
The combined effect of the new civil justice reforms, changes in the funding and 
recoverability of legal costs and structural shifts in the legal regulatory environment 
risks contributing to a ‘perfect storm’, threatening the rights of consumers to achieve 
effective vindication of their rights at proportionate cost.  In a challenging economic 
climate, the risk of unmet consumer redress in lower value claims is increasing.  
 
Claims purchasing companies occupy as disintermediators the contentious gap in 
access to justice between unrepresented consumers and experienced commercial 
airline carriers. Their removal risks disproportionately eroding means of consumer 
access to justice, and perpetuating an unfair structural imbalance, in favour of 
carriers apparently unwilling to shoulder responsibilities under the Regulation,  
 
The price of maintaining access to justice is vigilance and evolution, and as public 
policy moves, so must the scope of traditional doctrines potentially infringing the 
rights of consumers to effective vindication of their rights.  
 
John Bates, Senior Lecturer, Northumbria University 
